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COMMENTS
INTERVENTION, JOINDER, AND ISSUE PRECLUSION: A
NEW LOOK AT TORT CLAIM PROCEDURES
[Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1979)].
"Where it has been adjudicated that there never was any responsibility
of the defendant to the injured person, there is absent that common
liability which is the fundamental basis for contribution."
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Vigen,
213 Minn. 120, 127, 5 N.W.2d 397, 40001 (1942) (the Vigen rule).
"[A] doctrine hardy enough to survive forty Minnesota winters of criticism at home, ostracism elsewhere and discontent within the court
which gave it birth must have substantial intrinsic virtues."
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Curtiss, 327

So. 2d 82, 86 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (referring to the Vgen rule), appeal dismissed,
341 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Minnesota employs an unusual and controversial method for deter-

mining whether contribution should be awarded in tort actions. The
Minnesota Supreme Court's recent interpretation of this technique in
Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co. I has thrown into question many generally accepted tort claim procedures. In Hart, the court addressed a difficult loss

allocation question2 within the context of a suit for contribution. 3 Hart
1. 276 N.W.2d 166 (Minn. 1979).
2. See id. at 168-70. In recent years, the Minnesota Supreme Court has confronted
risk of loss allocation problems, particularly in contribution and indemnity cases. See, e.g.,
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 257 N.W.2d 279 (1977). The result has
been a radical change in tort loss allocation concepts. See Note, ContributionandIndemni'tyAn Examinationof the Upheaval in Minnesota Tort Loss Allocation Concepts, 5 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 109, 145-64 (1979).
3. Contribution and indemnity are two major forms of tort loss allocation, see, e.g.,
Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 552 (1936), that
distribute fault among multiple defendants, commonly referred to as joint tortfeasors or
cotortfeasors. See Note, supra note 2, at 110 (suggesting that the term "cotortfeasor" is
more precise). Contribution is an equitable remedy, see, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304, 310, 50 N.W.2d 689, 693 (1951), that shifts
only part of the plaintiff's loss from one cotortfeasor to another cotortfeasor, while indemnity shifts the entire loss between cotortfeasors. See Note, supra note 2, at 110-11.
The Hart court confronted the difficulty of equitably allocating the risk of loss between a pilot, who had been found not liable in an earlier suit, see Hart v. Vogt, 306
Minn. 476, 238 N.W.2d 590 (1976), and defendant Cessna, which apparently had neither
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resolved the contribution problem. 4 The decision is important, however,
6
because its impact upon intervention,5 joinder, and issue preclusion7
may spell the end to piecemeal suits. To avoid the pitfalls posed by Hart,
future plaintiffs may be required to join all tortfeasors at the commencement of suit and defendants may be forced to decide whether or not to
intervene and at what cost. Under Hart, attorneys have new questions to
consider in determining whether and how to initiate or defend tort claim
actions.
The case originated when plaintiff's husband died in an airplane crash
apparently caused by an accumulation of ice on the plane's wings8
Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the pilot of the plane. 9
After a jury found the pilot not negligent,10 plaintiff filed a second action
against Cessna, the manufacturer of the airplane."1 Cessna then impleaded the pilot seeking contribution in the event Cessna was held liable
for any damages. 12 The trial court granted summary judgment for the
pilot because the finding in the first action that he was not negligent
destroyed common liability13-an element required for recovery of contribution among cotortfeasors.14 On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme
Court affirmed, 1 5 but remanded the case for implementation of an "equitable solution."16
Although Cessna had neither notice nor opportunity to litigate in the
first action, the equitable solution imposed by the court prevents Cessna
notice nor opportunity to litigate its proportionate liability in that earlier suit. See 276
N.W.2d at 168 n.2.
4. See notes 17-24 zntfa and accompanying text.
5. See notes 57-108 infa and accompanying text.
6. See notes 127-46 infa and accompanying text.
7. See notes 109-26 infa and accompanying text.
8. 276 N.W.2d at 167.
9. Id at 167-68.
10. See Hart v. Vogt, 306 Minn. 476, 477, 238 N.W.2d 590, 591 (1976).
11. 276 N.W.2d at 169. The plane had no deicing equipment and federal air regulations required none. Id at 167. Plaintiff alleged, in/er aha, negligence in design, manufacture, and sale of the airplane, and breach of implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose. Id at 168.
12. Id.
13. See id
14. A cotortfeasor seeking contribution from another must satisfy two tests. First, the
cotortfeasors must have common liability to the injured party. See Bunge v. Yager, 236
Minn. 245, 252, 52 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1952); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213
Minn. 120, 127, 5 N.W.2d 397, 400-01 (1942); Note, Coninbution and Indemnity Among
Tortfeasors in Minnesota, 37 MINN. L. REv. 470, 472 (1953). Second, the cotortfeasor seeking contribution must have paid more than his fair share of the loss. 276 N.W.2d at 168;
see, e.g., Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 364, 51 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1952) (general
rule).
15. 276 N.W.2d at 170.
16. See id.at 169-70.
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from suing the pilot for contribution.17 Nevertheless, Cessna may defend
against plaintiffs action by asserting the pilot's negligence or any other
defense that would have been available had Cessna been a party to the
first suit.18 Moreover, the pilot whose negligence the jury will determine
in the second action may be required to appear at trial for cross-examination by either plaintiff or Cessna.19 Only Cessna may be held liable to
plaintiff, however, because the pilot's non-liability to plaintiff is res judicata. 20 Cessna's potential liability is for its proportionate share of negligence only; therefore, Cessna obtains the benefit of contribution without
actually being given that relief.2' Cessna will have the option to bar
relitigation of plaintiffs damages, an issue previously determined in
plaintiff's suit against the pilot.22 As a result of the court's solution in
Hart, plaintiff may receive judgment only for Cessna's liability as mea17. See id at 169.
18. See id On remand, the jury will not be informed of the pilot's non-negligence as
determined in the first suit. Id at 169 n.6. In this cryptic footnote to the Hart opinion, the
court states, "In future cases, the trial court shall determine, prior to trial, whether the
defendant in a second action may maintain an action for contribution against a defendant
successful in a prior action." Id
19. Id at 169. The examination of the pilot would be governed by MINN. R. Civ. P.
43.02 (examination of hostile witnesses and adverse parties).
20. See 276 N.W.2d at 169 & n.3. Res judicata extinguishes a claim by merger if the
judgment in the first action was in favor of the claimant, and by bar if thejudgment in the
first action was against the claimant. In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1941), the court phrased the effects of res judicata as
follows:
The [resjudicata] effect of ajudgment appears in at least three aspects. There is:
(1) Merger, by which a judgment for the plaintiff merges his cause of action, so
that the original cause of action is terminated and a cause of action on the judgment takes its place. (2) Bar, by which a judgment for the defendant terminates
the original cause of action. (3) Collateral estoppel, by which questions of fact
and perhaps of law actually litigated in the action are conclusively determined in
subsequent actions in which the same questions arise, even though the cause of
action may be different.
Id at 84 n.4. See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment a (1942).
21. See 276 N.W.2d at 169-70. The court hypothesized that "if the jury in the second
lawsuit were to find plaintiff 30 percent at fault, [the pilot] 35 percent at fault, and Cessna
35 percent at fault, the total liability of Cessna would be only 35 percent." Id.at 170. If
the jury would find as the Hart court hypothesized, Cessna would be in the same position
as if Cessna were held jointly and severally liable for 70% of the judgment and had actually received contribution for half the amount from the pilot.
Ironically, the court's equitable solution places plaintiff in the unenviable position of
having to defend the pilot from Cessna's assertions of pilot negligence while allowing
Cessna to use as evidence any prior inconsistent statements made in the first trial. See
MINN. R. EvID. 801(d)(1) (a).

22. 276 N.W.2d at 170. Thejury in the first action fixed damages at $175,000.00. See
Hart v. Vogt, 306 Minn. 476, 477, 238 N.W.2d 590, 591 (1976). The ramifications of this
use of issue preclusion are explored in notes 109-26 in7fra and accompanying text.
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sured by the latter's percentage of negligence. 23 Plaintiff, therefore, carries the risk of a diminished award, or perhaps none at all-the result of
2
suing cotortfeasors in a piecemeal fashion. 4
II.

BACKGROUND ANALYSIS:

THE VIGEN

RULE

In reviewing the trial court's decision, 25 the Hart court squarely faced
the holding of American Motorists Insurance Co. v. V'gen. 26 That holding
established the principle, known as the Vgen rule,27 that a cotortfeasor

found not liable in one action cannot be sued for contribution by another
cotortfeasor in a subsequent action, even though the cotortfeasors were
not adversaries in the first sUit.28 Contribution is barred because common liability, an element of contribution, cannot be satisfied when one
cotortfeasor was found not liable to the plaintiff.29 Vigen applied to
cotortfeasors who were both defendants in the first suit, yet failed to
cross-claim for contribution or otherwise adversely determine their respective liability.

30

Spitzack v. Schumacher31 extended the Vigen rule to prevent a
cotortfeasor from suing for contribution even though the cotortfeasor was
not a party to the first action. 32 In Spitzack, plaintiffis husband was killed
23. See 276 N.W.2d at 170. Assuming as fact the hypothetical stated in note 21 supra,
plaintiff would receive $61,250.00 if Cessna chose to bar relitigation of damages.
24. See 276 N.W.2d at 169. If Cessna argued successfully that the total fault for the
crash was due to pilot negligence, plaintiff would recover nothing. The same result would
occur if Cessna's fault for the crash is equal to or less than plaintiff's fault. See Act of May
23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (comparative negligence statute applicable to Hart) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978)).
25. See 276 N.W.2d at 168-69.
26. 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942).
27. See, e.g., Note, The Minnesota Supreme Court 1963-61, 49 MINN. L. REV. 93, 165
(1964).
28. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 126-27, 5 N.W.2d 397, 40001 (1942); see note 3 supra. Promulgation of the Vgen rule required an express overruling
of Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Anderson, 191 Minn. 158, 253 N.W. 374 (1934) (finding of
non-negligence against first tortfeasor not res judicata for subsequent contribution action
by second tortfeasor found negligent in same suit). See 213 Minn. at 126, 5 N.W.2d at 400
("what was [stated in Hardware]as to the effect of the adjudication on the essential element
of the contribution is specifically overruled"). The rule also extends to indemnity actions.
Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 214 Minn. 436, 8 N.W.2d 471 (1943).
29. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 127, 5 N.W.2d 397,
400-01 (1942).
30. See id. at 121, 5 N.W.2d at 398; Note, supra note 27, at 161; note 46 infa and
accompanying text.
31. 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976).
32. Id at 148-49, 241 N.W.2d at 645. Extending the Vtgen rule to a situation in
which cotortfeasors are sued separately was foreshadowed as early as 1964. See Anderson
v. Gabrielson, 267 Minn. 176, 126 N.W.2d 239 (1964), notedin Note, supra note 27, at 16065. The Anderson court stated:
[A]ssume that A is injured in a collision between B and C and A sues B alone
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when struck by a vehicle in a car-pedestrian accident. 33 In the first action, plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against both the driver
and the owner of the vehicle. 34 These defendants then impleaded a bar
owner for contribution, alleging that the bar owner caused decedent's
death by illegally selling him intoxicants. 35 The court dismissed the
complaint against the bar owner and the jury found the defendants less
negligent than the deceased. 36 Defendants, therefore, were not liable to
plaintiff.37 In her second action, plaintiff sued the bar owner under the
dram shop law. 38 The bar owner impleaded the original defendants for
contribution, but the trial court dismissed the complaint relying upon
the Vigen rule.39 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, denying the
bar owner the right to recover contribution from defendants whose liability had been extinguished in the first action.40
The Vigen rule arose when two defendants were sued in the same action but did not become formal adversaries on the contribution issue.41
Spizack extended Vigen to cotortfeasors who were sued in separate ac4
2
tions by the injured plaintiff.4 This is the Jigen-Spilzack rule. 3

Both Vigen and Spitzack denied contribution among cotortfeasors despite the fact that the cotortfeasors were not adverse parties in the first
suit. Many courts and commentators have criticized the Vigen rule44 for
without C's knowledge. B is exonerated and the time to appeal expires. If A
subsequently sues C and obtains a judgment, under the Vigen rule C is barred
from recovering contribution against B, although C had neither notice nor an
opportunity to be heard in the litigation which foreclosed his rights.
267 Minn. at 180 n.9, 126 N.W.2d at 242 n.9. This is precisely what occurred in Hart. See
276 N.W.2d at 168, 169 n.3.
33. 308 Minn. at 144, 241 N.W.2d at 643.
34. Id
35. Id
36. Id In Spitzack, after the respondents sought to implead the bar owner in the first
action, the latter opposed inclusion by a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, severance.
See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 5 n.2, Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241
N.W.2d 641 (1976). The trial court dismissed defendant's third-party action. 308 Minn.
at 144, 241 N.W.2d at 643.
The jury in the first suit found decedent 95% negligent and defendants 5% negligent.
Id
37. See Act of May 23, 1969, ch. 624, § 1, 1969 Minn. Laws 1069, 1069 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 604.01(1) (1978)).
38. 308 Minn. at 144, 241 N.W.2d at 642; see MINN. STAT. § 340.95 (1978).
39. 308 Minn. at 144-45, 241 N.W.2d at 643.
40. Id at 148-49, 241 N.W.2d at 645.
41. See American Motorist Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 120, 5 N.W.2d 397, 397
(1942).
42. See Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 147-48, 241 N.W.2d 641, 644 (1976).
43. This phrase, the Vgen-Spitzack rule, was coined by the Hart court. See 276
N.W.2d at 169.
44. See, e.g., Wright,]oinderof Claims and Parties Under Modem PleadingRules, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 580, 595 & n.63 (1952) (citing authorities criticizing Vigen); 12 ALA. L. REv. 208,
210 (1959); 56 HARV. L. REV. 477 (1942); 41 MICH. L. REV. 508 (1942); 37 MINN. L.
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extending res judicata45 to foreclose the contribution claim of a non-adversary party who never litigated the issue.46 In defense of the rule, ProREv. 470, 479 (1953); 27 MINN. L. REV. 519 (1943).

Criticism of the Vigen rule has
reached the ears of other courts, see, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Curtiss, 327 So. 2d 82, 86
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (Vigen rule has little currency elsewhere and is heavily criticized),
appealdismissed, 341 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1976), as well as the Minnesota Supreme Court. See,
e.g., Anderson v. Gabrielson, 267 Minn. 176, 180, 126 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1964);
Radmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 75-76, 117 N.W.2d 738, 741 (1962); Mocuik v.
Svoboda, 253 Minn. 562, 566-67, 93 N.W.2d 547, 550 (1958); Bocchi v. Karnstedt, 238
Minn. 257, 261, 56 N.W.2d 628, 631 (1953).
45. Res judicata, or claim preclusion as it is sometimes called, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 74, Comment d, at 7-8 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976); Vestal, Res
Judcata/ClaimPreclusion."Judgment for the Clai~nant, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 357 (1967), denotes
that a valid, final judgment, when rendered on the merits, "is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim
or demand." IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.405[1], at 621 (2d ed. 1974); accord,
Youngstown Mines Corp. v. Prout, 266 Minn. 450, 473, 124 N.W.2d 328, 340 (1963); see
Scott-Peabody & Assoc. v. Northern Leasing Corp., 273 Minn. 236, 239, 140 N.W.2d 614,
616 (1966). Thus, res judicata differs from collateral estoppel in that the former extinguishes a claim on the same cause of action between the parties or their privies, while the
latter bars relitigation of issues regardless of whether the cause of action is the same in the
second suit as in the first. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322,
326 (1955). The public policy behind resjudicata centers on the need to end litigation, see
Bratnober v. Illinois Farm Supply Co., 169 F. Supp. 85, 89 (D. Minn. 1959), that parties
ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issues more than once, and that when a
right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
judgment thereon is conclusive. See Herreid v. Deaver, 193 Minn. 618, 259 N.W. 189
(1935). See also Moschzisker, ResJudicata, 38 YALE L.J. 299, 299-300 (1929) (three-fold
objective of res judicata is to conserve court time, protect persons from repeated litigation,
and promote peace and harmony in the community by giving permanence to disputes
between parties).
46. See Note, supra note 27, at 161. The term "adversary parties," as used in the
statement that cotortfeasors must have been adversary parties in a prior action for res
judicata to conclude their liability inter se, has been held to mean those who by the pleadings are arrayed on opposite sides. Merrill v. St. P. City Ry., 170 Minn. 332, 334, 212
N.W. 533, 533 (1927), overruledon other grounds, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213
Minn. 120,5 N.W.2d 397 (1942); see, e.g., Casey v. Balunas, 19 Conn. Supp. 365, 113 A.2d
867 (1955); Pearlman v. Truppo, 10 N.J. Misc. 477, 159 A. 623, opinion adopted, 10 N.J.
Misc. 772, 160 A. 334 (1932). The Pearlman court felt the question to be an easy one:
What is meant by adverse parties scarcely needs definition. Its significance is
apparent from the expression itself. They must be opposite parties to an issue
between them. The issue must be proffered by one and controverted by the
other. They must be arrayed on opposite sides of the issue which must be raised
by appropriate cross-pleadings between the defendants themselves, so that each
may have control of the proceedings to enable him to exhaust the question of
liability interse. It is not enough that they, by their separate answers, deny liability and claim that the accident was due to the negligence of the other as such
pleading only goes to answering the claim of the plaintiff and tenders no issue to
which the other defendant may demur or reply to or join issue upon so as to
settle the liability one to the other.
Id at 478-79, 159 A. at 624. But see Lynch v. Chicago Transit Auth., 62 Ill. App. 2d 220,
210 N.E.2d 792 (1965); Gish Realty Co. v. Central City, 260 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1965).
Courts have expressly declared, however, that the mere attempt to escape liability by
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fessor Wright has suggested that the opportunity to litigate contribution
in the first action through the use of cross-claims prevents some of the
injustice that might otherwise result. 47 The Minnesota Supreme Court
also has recognized that the harsh effects of Vi'en are mitigated by the
opportunity to implead or intervene.48 Furthermore, the court has stated
that the V'gen rule does not depend upon res judicata for its operation;
throwing the burden or blame on a codefendant does not make the codefendants adversaries. See, e.g., Merrill v. St. P. City Ry., 170 Minn. at 333, 212 N.W. at 533, overruledon
other grounds, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 5 N.W.2d 397 (1942);
Pearlman v. Truppo, 10 N.J. Misc. at 478-79, 159 A. at 624, opinion adopted, 10 N.J. Misc.
772, 160 A. 334 (1932); Snyder v. Marken, 116 Wash. 270, 199 P. 302 (1921).
The current position proposed by the American Law Institute reflects an affinity for
the Vigen rule:
§ 82 Parties Aligned on the Same Side
Parties who are not adversaries to each other under the pleadings in an
action involving them and a third party are bound by and entitled to the benefits of issue preclusion with respect to each other and which are essential to the
judgment rendered.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975). The important
concern is whether the co-parties had "an opportunity and incentive to litigate the issues
arising between them that is equivalent to that between parties whose opposition is defined through the pleadings." Id, Comment a, at 40. Thereafter, a Vigen rule illustration
is given:
A, the owner of a building, sues B, a gas utility, and C, a contractor doing
repair work on the building, contending that through the negligence of both a
gas line in the building was ruptured, resulting in an explosion that demolished
the building. B and C each contend that he was not negligent and that the other
was. If they have a full and fair opportunity to litigate these contentions, ajudgment in favor of A against C but in favor of B is preclusive of the issue that B
was not negligent in a subsequent action between C and B.
Id § 82, Illustration 1; see Creeco Co. v. Northern Ill. Gas Co., 73 Il1. App. 218, 219
N.E.2d 257 (1966). Apparently, the trend is toward the Restatement's position. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra, Reporter's Note, at 43. See generall~y Vestal,
Preclusion/ResJudtcataVariables." Parties, 50 IOWA L. REV. 27 (1964). It should be noted,
however, that exoneration of a cotortfeasor does not necessarily prove that the elements of
liability never existed; instead, exoneration may result from plaintiff's inability to carry his
burden of proof. See Note, supra note 27, at 164-65. Thus, it appears that the conclusiveness of a judgment in a Vgen situation depends upon concepts of waiver, judicial economy, and due process notions of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. See, e.g., Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 & n.7 (1979).
47. See Wright, supra note 44, at 595-96 n.64 (favoring compulsory cross-claims when
no Vzen-type rule extant). The failure to cross-claim for contribution may constitute a
waiver of the need to be adversaries by the pleadings. The court should then look to
whether the parties were adversaries in fact. See note 46 supra.
48. See Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976), wherein the
court reflected:
While the Vigen rule has been frequently criticized, its potentially harsh
application has been effectively minimized by modern third-party practice. It is
now possible for the diligent tortfeasor to litigate the issue of contribution contemporaneously with the main action by means of intervention, impleader, or
cross-claim.
Id at 147 n.1, 241 N.W.2d at 644 n.1.
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instead, it focuses upon the nonexistence of common liability-an essential requirement for contribution.4 9 Recently, the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments50 supported a developing trend towards applying Vgen in situations in which the cotortfeasors are aligned on the same side, even if
they are not adversaries by the pleadings. Splizack, however, apparently
has never been expressly adopted by another jurisdiction.
The refusal of other jurisdictions to extend the bar against receiving
contribution to a nonparty cotortfeasor as in Spi/zack may reflect a strong
policy consideration. Finding a defendant not negligent does not necessarily mean that the defendant was in fact not negligent; rather, it could
mean that the plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proof. An absent
cotortfeasor should not be precluded from seeking contribution because
of plaintiff's possible failures. A cotortfeasor seeking contribution may
well present a more vigorous attack on the other cotortfeasor's position.
After all, a cotortfeasor has only one chance at recovering contribution,
but, a plaintiff injured by two defendants has, because of joint and several liability,51 two chances to recover for his injuries. Furthermore, it
would be manifestly unfair to categorize the interests of the absent
cotortfeasor as "adequately represented" by the plaintiff for two reasons.
First, the absent cotortfeasor's defense might include not only an attack
on the other cotortfeasor, but also an attack on the plaintiff. Second, as
stated above, the plaintiff, having another chance at recovery available,
might not present the best case possible.
After Spizack extended the V'gen rule to dismiss the contribution claim
of a cotortfeasor who was not a party to the first action, it became clear
that the new Vgen-Spi/zack rule could succumb to a constitutional due
49. See Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 252, 52 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1952). In an attempt to soften criticism, the court stated:
It is clear that the decision in the Vigen case is based upon the theory that
the doctrine of resfitdicata is not involved, but that an action for contribution
rests upon a common liability of joint tort-feasors to an injured party and the
payment of more than his share by one of the codefendants; and that when the
nonliability of one of the codefendants is established in the original action there
can be no right to contribution for the reason that there is no common liability.
Id; see 276 N.W.2d at 168 n.2. Notwithstanding the above protestation, it seems evident
that use of the prior judgment is an estoppel against the other cotortfeasor. See American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Vigen, 213 Minn. 120, 127, 5 N.W.2d 397, 401 (1942) (Stone, J.,
concurring) (defendants may use judgments in original action as conclusive evidence that
there was no liability to plaintiffs). But cf Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis.
2d 119, 122, 243 N.W.2d 401, 404 (1976) (per curiam) (on rehearing) (common liability
determined as of time of accident; prior determination of no liability not effective against
other cotortfeasor in subsequent action for contribution).
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 82 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1975); see note
46 supra.
51. See note 63 infra.
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process attack. 52 Potentially, the rule could apply to bar the contribution claim of a nonparty cotortfeasor who had neither notice nor opportunity to litigate in the first action. 53 Facing this exact situation in
55
Hart,54 and desiring not to twice vex the pilot for the same cause, the

life into the Vigen-Spttzack rule through an
court attempted to breathe
"equitable solution." 56 Instead, the ramifications of the Hart solution require an evaluation of Vigen-Spi/zack's continued vitality.
52. Se Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 149, 241 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1976)
(Kelly, J., concurring).
53. In Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976), Justice Kelly
warned:
If either notice or opportunity to litigate had been denied [to the precluded
party], I would have favored reversal because the element of common liability
would have been conclusively decided against appellant in an action in which he
could not have been heard. Such a result would offend my notions of fairness,
due process, and affording appropriate remedies for wrongs. Minn. Const. art. 1,
§8.
Id at 149, 241 N.W.2d at 645 (Kelly, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). More recently the United States Supreme Court adhered to this notion of constitutional protection. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979) ("It is a
violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party nor
a privy and therefore has neverhadanopportunity to beheard.") (emphasis added); cf BlonderTongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971) (due
process prohibits collaterally estopping litigants who never appeared in a prior action);
Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1942) (due process mandates that no person be deprived of personal or property
rights by a judgment without notice and an opportunity to be heard).
In a factual situation similar to Spitzack, the Wisconsin Supreme Court disallowed
preclusive use of a prior determination of nonliability against a nonparty to that prior suit.
See Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 125c, 243 N.W.2d 401, 403
(1976) (per curiam) (on rehearing). The Reddington court, after noting the common liability requirement for contribution, rejected the Spitzack approach because common liability
is to be determined "as of the time the accident occurs," not when the contribution claim
is asserted. Id Extinguishing the liability as to one cotortfeasor does not affect the right of
the remaining cotortfeasor to seek contribution. See id The court recognized that the
principles involved were those of res judicata. Id There are, however, factual differences
between Reddngton and Spitzack. In Reddt'ngton, Beefeaters cross-complained for contribution, but the court erroneously dismissed the cross-complaint before the jury reached a
verdict. Id at 125c, 243 N.W.2d at 404. In Spitzack, after the respondents sought to implead the bar owner in the first action, the latter opposed inclusion by a motion to dismiss
or, in the alternative, severance. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 5 n.2, Spitzack v.
Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976). The trial court dismissed. Id at 5.
54. See 276 N.W.2d at 169 n.3.
55. See id.at 169. The policy is that " 'a party should not be twice vexed for the same
cause, and that it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation.' " Houser v.
Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 807 (Minn. 1978) (quoting Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn.
267, 270, 233 N.W.2d 292, 294 (1975)).
56. See 276 N.W.2d at 169.
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COMPARISON OF HART AND SPITZACK

To assess the impact of Hart on tort claim procedures, one must inquire into the relationship between Hart and Spilzack. Has Hart impliedly overruled Spizack, or does each decision continue in force,
confined to its own procedural history? Answering this question requires
an examination of both contribution and the allocation of burden and
risk when suing piecemeal.
As to the technical right to recover contribution, the Hart court stated
that the facts before it fell within the Vigen-Spitzack rule.57 Like the bar
owner in Spitzack, Cessna had not been a party to the first judgment.
Common liability, the basis for the Vigen-Spitzack rule, had not been satisfied because the jury found the pilot not liable in the first action.
Therefore, the Vigen-Spiezack rule controlled to deny Cessna contribution. 58 Although Spilzack involved a cotortfeasor who had an opportunity to litigate in the first action, Hart involved a cotortfeasor who did
not. 59 If this difference is important, perhaps the Hart court's reliance on
Spitzack was misplaced. Nevertheless, the court in Hart refused to modify
the common liability rule;6o to do so "would [have been] inappropriate"
when a jury had already found the cotortfeasor not negligent. 6 1
On a superficial level, this answers the inquiry: Hart does not overrule
Vgen-Spiazack regarding the common liability element of contribution.
This answer fails, however, to focus upon how Hart and Spitzack allocate
the burden and risk of suing piecemeal in tort actions. Spitzack merely
placed the burden on the second cotortfeasor by denying the claim for
contribution. 62 Hart not only altered what would normally be Cessna's
joint and several liability, 63 but placed the onus of Cessna's relief on
57. Id. at 168.
58. Id
59. Compare id. at 169 n.5 with Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 144, 241
N.W.2d 641, 643 (1976).
60. 276 N.W.2d at 168-69. The court noted that the requirement of common liability
had been modified under some circumstances to achieve equitable results. Id. at 169; see
Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 312 Minn. 114, 130, 257 N.W.2d 679, 689 (1977).
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court reaffirmed its requirement of common liability as an element of contribution. See Conde v. City of Spring Lake Park, 290 N.W.2d
164, 165-66 (Minn. 1980). According to Conde, neither Lamberson nor Hart abolished the
requirement.
61. 276 N.W.2d at 169.
62. See 308 Minn. at 148-49, 241 N.W.2d at 645.
63. Joint and several liability allows the injured party to recover the entire award
from any defendant against whom a judgment is received. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 46 (4th ed. 1971); Note, Reconciling ComparativeNegligence, Contril
bution, andJoint and Several Liability, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1166, 1170 (1977).
Minnesota has adopted this rule, see Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 110, 33 N.W. 320,
321 (1887) (Mitchell, J.), and extended it to cover concurrent negligent acts. See, e.g.,
Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 20, 178 N.W.2d 841, 844-45 (1970); Dyson v. Schmidt,
260 Minn. 129, 139, 109 N.W.2d 262, 269 (1961); Thorstad v. Doyle, 199 Minn. 543, 553,
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plaintiff by limiting plaintiffs potential recovery. 64 The implications of
Hart are both important and unclear. Are plaintiffs required to bear the
burden and risk of suing piecemeal in future tort actions? Or, do nonparty cotortfeasors have an affirmative burden to intervene to protect
their right to contribution?
Language in Hart supports the conclusion that the plaintiff bears the
burden and risk of suing only one cotortfeasor when, if the jury finds the
first cotortfeasor not liable, the plaintiff commences a second suit against
another cotortfeasor.65 This differs from Spitzack, in which the court
placed the burden of suing piecemeal on the second cotortfeasor defending in the second action.66
More likely, however, Hart does not overrule Spitzack concerning the
burden and risk; the cases are reconcilable on notice grounds. Spitzack
involved a cotortfeasor who had been served originally with a third-party
complaint,67 and who therefore had the opportunity to litigate a contribution claim in the first action. 68 On the other hand, Hart involved a
cotortfeasor who had neither notice nor opportunity to litigate its contribution claim.69 Under Spitzack, whenever a defendant impleads a third
273 N.W. 255, 260 (1937); Flaherty v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 39 Minn. 328, 329, 40
N.W. 160, 160-61 (1888) (citing cases from New York, California, and Michigan).
The judicial alteration ofjoint and several liability in Hart probably does not invade
the legislative province. Cf Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1049 (Alaska 1975) (judicial
adoption of comparative negligence); Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 826-27, 532
P.2d 1226, 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874 (1975) (same); Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,
438 (Fla. 1973) (same); Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 659-60, 275
N.W.2d 511, 517-18 (1979) (judicial adoption of comparative negligence within power of
either court or legislature).
In recent years, much has been written about multiple-party litigation in comparative negligence jurisdictions. The problems encompass joint and several liability, contribution and indemnity, and joinder and settlement. See generaly Comment, Comparative
Neghgence in California: Multiple Party Litigation, 7 PAC. L.J. 770 (1976); Note, Contribution
and Indemnity Coltide with ComparativeNegligence-The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity, 18
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779 (1978); Note, Multp/le Party Litigation n Comparative Negigence.Incomplete Resolution offjoinder and Settlement Problems, 32 Sw. L.J. 669 (1978); Note, Reconciling Comparative Negligence, Contribution,andjoint and Several Liability, supra; Note, supra note
2.
64. 276 N.W.2d at 169; see notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
65. 276 N.W.2d at 169. After setting forth the dilemma facing the court, see note 3
supra, the opinion prefaced the "equitable solution" with this broad language:
The plaintiff does have, and should have, the right to control his own lawsuitto sue or not to sue whomever he chooses. However, if there are two or more
possible defendants and plaintiff elects to sue them piecemeal, it is he who should
bear any risk imposed by using that procedure.
276 N.W.2d at 169; see notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
'66. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 32-40 supra and accompanying text.
68. See Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 144, 241 N.W.2d 641, 643 (1976);
notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
69. 276 N.W.2d at 169 n.5; note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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party as a cotortfeasor, the impleaded cotortfeasor must choose between
inclusion in the suit or possible preclusion from recovering contribution.
The plaintiff does not suffer as a result of suing piecemeal if the first
defendant bails him out by impleading a second defendant. 70 But, when
the defendant in the second action has had neither notice nor opportunity to defend in the first action, the defendant will retain the benefit of
71
contribution-some limitation on liabilty-at the plaintiff's expense.
This reconciliation of Hart and Spitzack still leaves an important area
uncovered. Must a cotortfeasor who has actual knowledge of a suit, but
who has not been served with process, intervene in a tort action to prevent a contribution claim from being extinguished by the Vigen-Spi/zack
rule? The question assumes critical importance for the attorney whose
client may be liable in tort to an injured plaintiff. If Hart governs this
situation, intervention will be unnecessary, 72 but, regrettably, Spizack
7
appears to indicate that intervention will be required. 3
IV.

MANDATORY INTERVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO
CONTRIBUTION

Whether to require intervention of a nonparty cotortfeasor who has
notice of a claim is more than an academic issue. The question may
arrive before the Minnesota courts relatively soon, perhaps in the context
of a products liability suit. Under recent law, an attorney for a products
liability claimant must give notice "to all persons against whom the
claim is likely to be made," 74 including the "time, place and circumstances

. . .

giving rise to the claim and an estimate of compensation or

other relief to be sought."7 5 Because all persons within the chain of manufacture and distribution are entitled to notice,76 the problem of requir70. But ef Note, supra note 27, at 169-70 & n.33 (suggesting that defendant should be
required to send notice to all third parties who could be found liable; failure to notify
allows cotortfeasors to relitigate fault determination). Relying upon a defendant to implead a third party is not necessarily a good risk, however, because under present practice
the defendant probably loses nothing by failing to implead other cotortfeasors.
71. This is the result of Hart. See 276 N.W.2d at 169-70.
72. Cf id at 169 (plaintiff bears risk of suing defendants piecemeal).
73. The court in Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 147 n.1, 241 N.W.2d 641,
644 n.1 (1976), suggested that intervention would prevent operation of the Vgen rule. See
note 48 supra and accompanying text.
74. MINN. STAT. § 604.04(1) (1978).
75. Id. The notice must be given within six months after entering into an attorneyclient relationship. Id
Although the statute specifies that "[a]ctual notice of sufficient facts to reasonably put
a person against whom the claim is to be made or his insurer on notice of a possible claim
satisfies the notice requirements [of the statute]," id, whether this type of notice will suffice to require intervention is doubtful. See notes 105-08 infa and accompanying text.
76. See MINN. STAT. § 604.04(1) (1978).
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ing intervention 77 to preserve the right of contribution seems imminent.
Under the igen-Spiizack rule, a determination of no liability in a prior
action precludes a nonparty cotortfeasor from asserting a claim for contribution against the original defendant.78 If Minnesota requires intervention to prevent a contribution claim from being extinguished by the
Vigen-Sptizack rule, the attorney for the nonparty cotortfeasor must
choose between the Scylla of inclusion in the tort claim action and the
Charybdis of preclusion from recovering contribution. The choice must
be made after weighing the costs of litigation and the potential liability
of the intervenor, both to the injured party and to other possible claimants. 79 In any event, the preclusive effect of an initial judgment coerces
third-party intervention.80
77. Minnesota provides for intervention of right and permissive intervention. Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 24.01 (intervention as of right) wtzlh id 24.02 (permissive intervention). The trial court uses its discretion to allow permissive intervention when a person
seeks to assert a claim or defense having a question of law or fact in common with the
main action. See id The court weighs the benefits of intervention against the potential
delay in trial or prejudice "to the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." Id
Intervention as of right, however, is mandatory. MINN. R. Civ. P. 24.01 states that:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the dispostion of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Id The rule probably encompasses tort claim actions despite the absence of the word
"occurrence." The difference between the counterclaim rule and the intervention rule
implies the inclusion of tort claims in the latter rule. The word "occurrence," which is
found in the federal counterclaim rule, was specifically deleted from the Minnesota rule in
order to make tort counterclaims noncompulsory. See House v. Hanson, 245 Minn. 466,
472-73, 72 N.W.2d 874, 878 (1955); 1 J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE 486 (1970). Compare MINN. R. Civ. P. 13.01 with FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The intervention rule, however, comports with its federal counterpart and does not exclude tort
actions. Cf Avery v. Campbell, 279 Minn. 383, 387-88, 157 N.W.2d 42, 45-46 (1968)
(helicopter lessor sought to intervene as of right to set aside default judgment against pilotlessee when intervenor, although not named party to default proceeding, was potentially
liable under lease agreement).
The absence of the term "occurrence" may, however, reflect the belief that a party
would be foolish to intervene in a tort action, thereby subjecting himself to potential liability, not only in the action involved, but as to other claims as well. Cf Note, supra note
27, at 165 ("Even if notice is given, the potential contribution claimant may be required to
make an unhappy choice between forfeiting his claim and litigating in an inconvenient
forum where he may expose himself to other causes of action as well as the very cause of
action in question.").
78. See 276 N.W.2d at 168.
79. See Note, supra note 27, at 165.
80. See McCoid, A Sigle PackageforMultiparty Disputes, 28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 719-20
(1976). The preclusive effect approach has also been advanced in situations in which the
defendant gives notice of suit to another tortfeasor. See Note, supra note 27, at 69-70 &
n.33 (1964) (defendant would be required to give notice to all possible cotortfeasors, who,
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Extending the preclusive effect of the Vigen-Spitzack rule to a nonparty
raises constitutional questions. May a nonparty cotortfeasor be compelled to intervene at the risk of losing a potential claim for contribution?
Two United States Supreme Court decisions indicate opposing viewpoints. In Chase NationalBank v. Norwalk, 8 1 Justice Brandeis wrote, "[tihe
law does not impose upon any person absolutely entitled to a hearing the
burden of voluntary intervention in a suit to which he is a stranger."82
This language intimates that intervention cannot be coerced. Unfortunately, the opinion does not state if the prohibition reflects due process
considerations or merely the absence of legislation requiring intervention. On the other hand, in Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson,8 3 Justice Harlan suggested what might be termed a federal common
law requirement of compulsory intervention.84 While recognizing the
general principle that a nonparty is not estopped by a judgment in a
prior suit,85 Justice Harlan stated: "it might be argued that [the nonparty] should be bound by the previous decision because, although technically a nonparty, he had purposely bypassed an adequate opportunity
to intervene."86 Perhaps, then, intervention may be coerced. The ques-

tion remains unsettled.
Extension of the Vigen-Spitzack rule to a nonparty has the same precluif they failed to intervene, would be bound by any adjudication). The preclusive approach, which almost amounts to compulsory intervention, see McCoid, supra, at 718, goes
further than the approach of merely encouraging intervention. See, e.g., 7 C. WRIGHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1610, at 103 (1972) (encouraging
nonparties to intervene by notifying them of pendency of the action, resulting in bringing
in of rule 19(a) parties). But see Semmel, CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality andjonderof Parties,
68 COLUM. L. REV. 1457, 1475 (1968) (preferring mandatory joinder of parties over preclusion, but advocating preclusion if notice given and outsider fails to intervene).
Under rule 13, a party who does not assert a compulsory counterclaim in the pending
action may be precluded from advancing the claim in a subsequent suit. See MINN. R.
CIv. P. 13.01. This differs, however, from the coercion of mandatory intervention. Under
rule 13.01, the person forced to elect between inclusion or possible preclusion is already in
the action. Coercing intervention, however, forces a person not a party to the pending
action to elect between inclusion in the suit, or, in the instance of igen-Spatzack, possible
preclusion of the contribution right.
Although the court in Hart reasoned that the Vgen-Spitzack rule depends upon notions of common liability rather than upon resjudicata, see 276 N.W.2d at 168-69; Bunge
v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 252, 52 N.W.2d 446, 450 (1952), the preclusive effect of a prior
adjudication is apparent. See Radmacher v. Cardinal, 264 Minn. 72, 76, 117 N.W.2d 738,
741-42 (1962).
81. 291 U.S. 431 (1934) (mortgagee not bound by judgment against mortgagor obtained after mortgagee acquired interest).
82. Id at 441.
83. 390 U.S. 102 (1968).
84. See id. at 114 (dictum).
85. Id; see Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934).
86. 390 U.S. at 114. Justice Harlan specifically declined to decide whether, under the
facts of that case, the nonparty should be bound by the prior decision. Id.
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sive effect as mandatory intervention legislation.87 Accordingly, the two
methods of preclusion may be profitably compared. Mandatory intervention forces the nonparty to choose between inclusion in the pending
action or preclusion by the final judgment.8 8 The V'gen-Spitzack rule
tends to coerce intervention in a pending action by the threat that a final
judgment will preclude any claim for contribution.8 9 For both methods
of preclusion the question becomes: "must the outsider be made a party,
or do notice and opportunity to be heard suffice to compel an outsider's
choice between [intervention] and preclusion?"90
In considering this question, the Vien-Spitzack rule's effect on litigants
must be recognized. The preclusive effect of the rule coerces intervention
to protect the right to contribution at the cost of subjecting the
cotortfeasor to possible liability for the injured party's losses.91 Coercing
intervention by holding the relief of contribution as hostage may violate
the Minnesota Constitution, which protects contribution as a right.92
This constitutional protection derives from Carlson v. Smogard.93 In Carlson, the supreme court struck down a workers' compensation statute that
summarily denied a third party's indemnity claim against an employer.94
The Carlson court based its decision upon due process and the "remedy
for every wrong" clause of the Minnesota Constitution.95 That clause
prohibits the deprivation of common law rights when a reasonable substitute has not been provided. 96 Because the Minnesota Supreme Court
has always permitted contribution between negligent cotortfeasors,97
contribution appears to be a common-law right in Minnesota.98 Thus,
87. For a recent proposal for mandatory intervention legislation, see Comment, Nonpartiesand PreclusionbyJudgment: The PrivioRule Reconsidered, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 1098, 112233 (1968).
88. See id at 1124.
89. See notes 78-80 supra and accompanying text.
90. McCoid, supra note 80, at 721.
91. The cotortfeasor may be liable for other claims as well. See note 79 supra and
accompanying text.
92. See notes 93-101 infia and accompanying text.
93. 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974).
94. Id at 369, 215r N.W.2d at 620.
95. Id The "remedy for every wrong" section of the Minnesota Constitution reads in
part: "Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries or wrongs
which he may receive to his person, property or character ....
MINN. CONST. art. I,

§ 8.
96. See Agin v. Heyward, 6 Minn. 110 (Gil. 53) (1861).
97. See, e.g., Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887) (Mitchell, J.);
Note, supra note 14, at 471-72; Note, supra note 2, at 121-22.
98. Language in Tracy v. Streater/Litton Indus., 283 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1979), supports the conclusion that contribution is a common-law right protected by the "remedy
for every wrong" clause:
The cases before us concern only the contracting parties and must be distinguished from those involving the abrogation of third party common-law rights.
Accordingly, our invalidation of a provision which abrogated such a right with-
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the right to contribution takes on a constitutional dimension that entitles
the cotortfeasor to a hearing, thereby precluding, in the words of Justice
Brandeis, the imposition of the burden of intervention.99 Justice Kelly
apparently sensed the application of this constitutional protection when
he wrote in Spitzack:
If either notice or opportunity to litigate had been denied. . . I would
have favored reversal because the element of common liability would
have been conclusively decided against appellant in an action in which
he could not have been heard. Such a result would offend my notions of
fairness, due process, and affording appropriate remedies for wrongs.
Minn. Const. art. 1, § 8.100
Thus, denying the right of contribution to a party for mere failure to
intervene in a prior action might be unconstitutional, unless, as in Hart,
the court substitutes a remedy for the right taken away.101
Turning to the relationship between Hart and Spizack, one can see an
important distinction. Spitzack required a cotortfeasor to elect between
litigating in an action to which he could assert a valid procedural defense, t0 2 or face possible preclusion of the right to contribution.t03 No
such election was available to defendant Cessna in Hart. Despite the inequity of coercing a cotortfeasor to intervene in a tort action, thereby
subjecting him to potential liability, Spitzack is constitutionally defensible
upon the ground that the defendant drivers served process on the bar
owner, impleading the latter for contribution.104 The extension of
Spitzack to Hart possibly contravened notions of due process, fair play,
and substantial justice, however, because no notice, by service of process
or otherwise, was given to defendant Cessna. Only the court's "equitable
solution" mitigated this harm.
When a cotortfeasor has notice of a suit but has not been served with
out a reasonable substitute is not precedent for a decision here. See Carlson v.
Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215 N.W.2d 615 (1974); ....
Id. at 914 n.5. Thus, it is apparent that the Minnesota Supreme Court considered its
decision in Carlson mandated by the protection afforded the common-law rights of contribution and indemnity.
99. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Norwalk, 291 U.S. 431, 441 (1934); see notes 81-82 supra and
accompanying text.
100. Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 149, 241 N.W.2d 641, 645 (Kelly, J.,
concurring) (emphasis in original).
101. The court took away Cessna's right to contribution but substituted an equivalent
remedy altering Cessna's joint and several liability, imposing upon Cessna liability only
for its own negligence. See notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
102. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix at 5 n.2, Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn.
143, 241 N.W.2d 641 (1976).
103. See Spitzack v. Schumacher, 308 Minn. 143, 148-49, 241 N.W.2d 641, 644-45
(1976).
104. The defendant drivers impleaded the bar owner for contribution, alleging that
the bar owner caused the decedent's death by illegally selling him liquor. See 308 Minn.
at 144, 241 N.W.2d at 643.
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process, the Vigen-Spitzack rule should not apply to coerce intervention.
First, the inclination of a nonparty is to ignore, as none of his business,
pending litigation in which the individual has not been served with a
summons and complaint.105 The nonparty does not expect to litigate in
this situation. It seems unfair, therefore, to subject the nonparty to
choose between inclusion in the suit, with some potential liability, and
the possible loss of a contribution claim by staying out of the litigation.
Second, courts normally do not require persons to elect between inclusion or preclusion without first subjecting them to service of process and
the court's jurisdiction. Thus, an individual with a valid defense to service of process need not choose between defending or defaulting.106 Furthermore, if contribution is a constitutionally protected right in
Minnesota, due process or the "remedy for every wrong" clause 507 would
be violated by denying the claim to a person not within the jurisdiction
of the court. Finally, the policy behind intervention "lies in offering protection to nonparties,"108 not in coercing them to litigate their claims. For
all these reasons, it would seem that Spitzack should not be extended to

place nonparty cotortfeasors in the dilemma of choosing between intervention and loss of a claim for contribution. Unfortunately, given the
result in Hart, it is not clear how this problem will be avoided.
V.

ISSUE PRECLUSION

As part of its "equitable solution," the Hart court allowed defendant
Cessna to preclude plaintiff from relitigating the amount of damages previously determined in plaintiff's suit against the pilot.10 9 Thus, a party
in Cessna's position could, in a future case, relitigate the issue of damages
if the prior award was thought to be excessive, or limit the amount of
damages to the prior award if thought to be reasonable or low. Because
this defensive use of issue preclusion, or defensive collateral estoppel,1 10
105. McCoid, supra note 80, at 724.
106. Id at 723.
107. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8; notes 92-101 supra and accompanying text.
108. 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.02, at 24-31 to -32 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis
added).
109. See 276 N.W.2d at 170.
110. By extending to Cessna the choice of either relitigating the amount of plaintiff's
damages or simply allowing the prior determination to stand, see id, the Hart court appeared to confer upon Cessna the opportunity to use defensive collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel, also called issue preclusion, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 68 (lent. Draft No. 4, 1977), bars any attempt to relitigate an issue in a later suit between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim. See, e.g., Shimp v. Sederstrom,
305 Minn. 267, 270, 233 N.W.2d 292, 294 (1975); Sachs v. Jenista, 296 Minn. 535, 537,
210 N.W:2d 45, 46-47 (1975) (per curiam); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
Although Cessna did not appear as a party in the first action, this alone does not
prevent the use of issue preclusion. In Minnesota a nonparty to prior litigation may, in a
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contravenes the normal requirement of essentiality, the court's "equitable solution" should be explored.
As one of its elements, collateral estoppel requires that the issue to be
precluded from relitigation be essential to the judgment rendered,
in
subsequent suit, assert collateral estoppel against a party to that prior litigation. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 555, 163 N.W.2d 289, 294 (1968) (life insurance company in declaratory judgment action may use issue preclusion against a
defendant who was convicted in criminal proceeding to prevent recovery under policy),
appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 161 (1969); Lustik v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 519-20, 131
N.W.2d 741, 744 (1964) (in personal injury action, nonparty used collateral estoppel
against party to previous suit).
Allowing a nonparty to prior litigation to assert issue preclusion in a subsequent action contravenes the "mutuality rule." See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining
& Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912) ("It is a principle of general elementary law that
the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual."). "Under this mutuality doctrine, neither
party could use a prior judgment as an estoppel against the other unless both parties were
bound by the judgment." Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326-27 (1979); see
Gustafson v. Gustafson, 178 Minn. 1, 5, 226 N.W. 412, 413 (1929); Nowak v. Knight, 44
Minn. 241, 243, 46 N.W. 348, 349 (1890). But ef Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn.
249, 256-57, 72 N.W.2d 364, 369-70 (1955) (recognizing mutuality rule but noting certain
exceptions such as when a plaintiff deliberately selects his forum and unsuccessfully
presents his proof). Gammel relied upon Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172
A. 260 (Super. Ct. 1934). The Coca-Cola Co. court stated:
The requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To hold otherwise
would be to allow repeated litigation of identical questions, expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having lost on a question of fact to re-open and retry all the old issues each time he can obtain a new adversary not in privity with
his former one.
Id. at 133, 172 A. at 263. Both the American Law Institute, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS app. § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976), and the United States Supreme
Court, see Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. at 331-32 (allowing district courts
broad discretion in determining when collateral estoppel should be applied and setting
forth a balancing test), have abandoned the mutuality requirement, although some state
courts have recently reaffirmed adherence to the rule. See, e.g., Daigneau v. National Cash
Register Co., 247 So,2d 465 (Fla. 1971); Lukacs v. Kluessner, 154 Ind. App. 452, 456, 290
N.E.2d 125, 127 (1972); Keith v. Shiefen-Stockham Ins. Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 545,
498 P.2d 265, 273 (1972); Howell v. Vito's Trucking & Excavation Co., 386 Mich. 37, 191
N.W.2d 313 (1971).
Collateral estoppel may be used either "offensively" by a plaintiff seeking to foreclose
a defendant from litigating an issue the defendant had previously litigated in an action
against another party, see, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (defendants in private suit estopped from relitigating issues adversely determined in prior
SEC action); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yeager Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548, 559 (Minn.
1977), or it may be used "defensively" by a defendant seeking to prevent a plaintiff from
asserting a claim the plaintiff had previously litigated. See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (determination of patent
invalidity in prior action bars plaintiff from relitigating validity of patent in subsequent
action against a different defendant), overruhg Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
Since plaintiff in Hart cannot relitigate the amount of damages and Cessna may either
relitigate the amount or let the prior determination stand, see 276 N.W.2d at 170, the Hart
court effectively conferred upon Cessna the right to use "defensive" collateral estoppel.
111. E.g., Hauser v. Mealey, 263 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Minn. 1978) (essential to judg-
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the prior action. Relitigation of an issue imposes a burden on the parties
and the courts. To avoid this burden, collateral estoppel effect is only
given to essential issues-those to which careful consideration is given
because of their importance to the outcome of the first lawsuit. It is recof an
ognized that the interest in providing a considered determination
112
relitigation.
by
imposed
burden
any
outweighs
issue
Scholars advance at least two justifications for restricting collateral estoppel to essential issues. First, determination of a non-essential issue
does not bear sufficient indicia of correctness to warrant issue preclusion.1 13 Because the judgment did not turn on the issue decided, the jury
may not have considered it carefully. The jury may also have compromised quickly to finish its deliberations, knowing full well that by finding
the alleged cotortfeasor not negligent, the award would be meaningless
to the action before them. 1 14 Second, when a litigant is successful, any
adverse jury determination normally cannot be appealed by that litiment); Shimp v. Sederstrom, 305 Minn. 267, 270, 233 N.W.2d 292, 294 (1975) (litigated
and determined in prior action); Sachs v. Jenista, 296 Minn. 535, 537, 210 N.W.2d 45, 4647 (1973) (per curiam) (necessary to verdict); Leonard v. Schall, 132 Minn. 446, 449, 157
N.W. 723, 725 (1916) (litigated and determined in former suit). As the Minnesota court
stated in Neilson v. Pennsylvania Coal & Oil Co., 78 Minn. 113, 116-17, 80 N.W. 859, 860
(1899), "[A] former judgment does not operate as an estoppel by verdict except as to facts
shown to have been directly and distinctly put in issue, and the finding of which was
necessary to uphold the judgment."
Other courts follow the essentiality requirement. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods.
Corp. v. Machinists Local 1304, 344 F.2d 300, 306 (9th Cir. 1965); In re Estate of Simmons, 64 Cal. 2d 217, 222-23, 411 P.2d 97, 100,49 Cal. Rptr. 369, 372 (1966); Schneberger
v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 213 N.W.2d 913, 917 (Iowa 1973) (citing Purdes v.
Carvel Hall, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1256, 1263 (S.D. Iowa 1969)). The requirement is now the
general rule, see IB MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441[2], at 3777 (2d ed. 1974), and
the current stand of the American Law Institute:
§ 68. Issue Preclusion-General Rule
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid
and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on
the same or a different claim.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977). "A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party,. . . is also precluded from doing
so with a [nonparty]," id § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976), when "the issue was the same as
that involved in the present action and was actually litigated and essential to a prior
judgment that is valid and final." Id, Comment a. See generally Vestal, Res Judi
ca/a/Preclusion."Expansion, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 357, 359-60 (1974).
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, at 10, Comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977).
113. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.19, at 570 (2d ed. 1977);
Vestal, Preclusion/ResJudcata Variables." Nature of the Controversy, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 158,
170.
114. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 49.01(2) (in actions involving comparative fault statute,
court shall inform jury of the effect of its answers to the percentage of fault questions).
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gant. 11 5 Such an adverse determination is not essential to the judgment
rendered for the successful litigant; therefore, the determination is not a
proper subject for issue preclusion.
In Hart, the finding of pilot non-negligence in the first action' 16 made
determination of the damages issue unnecessary. 17 Although the special
verdict form required an answer to the damage issue,118 nothing turned

upon that answer. The supreme court underscored this conclusion. Despite plaintiff's request for additur or a new trial as to damages, 1 9 the
court addressed only the issue of pilot negligence in appellate review of
the first Hart action.120 Having upheld the jury's finding of no negligence,121 the court never reached plaintiff's requests regarding damages.
Yet, the Hart court held that plaintiff could not relitigate the issue unless
22
Cessna so desired.1
An issue collaterally estopped from relitigation is not subject to appellate review.12 3 Because of this, a future plaintiff subject to the Hart solution may find the issue of damages determined and foreclosed without
careful consideration by any court or deliberative body. Although a
party to a civil case has no constitutional right to appellate review of
either the decision or a particular issue,124 the Hart procedure may compound an inequity produced in a previous suit. Considering that the
Hart court attempted to fashion an "equitable solution," this would be
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, at 10, Comment h (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1977).
116. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
117. Use of the special verdict form does not change the result. A determination of no
liability requires no finding of damages. An award is meaningless to a judgment that
plaintiff take nothing by his action. Arguably, a cautionary court instruction as to the
importance of the award finding might suffice to cause careful consideration of the issue,
but this is speculative, especially if the jury knows that the case before it will not turn on
the issue of damages.
118. See Appellant's Brief & Appendix at 37-39, Hart v. Vogt, 306 Minn. 476, 238
N.W.2d 590 (1976).
119. See id. at 47.
120. See Hart v. Vogt, 306 Minn. 476, 238 N.W.2d 590 (1976).
121. See id at 478, 238 N.W.2d at 591.
122. See 276 N.W.2d at 170.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, at 10, Comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1977).
124. See In re Appeal of O'Rourke, 300 Minn. 158, 164, 220 N.W.2d 811, 815 (1974)
(Minnesota Constitution does not "either expressly or by necessary implication, guarantee
to the individual a right of appeal to this court"); cf. City of Minneapolis v. Wilkin, 30
Minn. 140, 144, 14 N.W. 581, 583 (1883) ("Independently of any express constitutional
guaranty, a person has no constitutional right to have his case reviewed on appeal.").
Because the greater power to deny review of a case necessarily includes the lesser power to
deny review of an issue, a person has no constitutional right in Minnesota to appellate
review. But cf Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (denial of appellate review in
criminal case in which state law provides full direct appellate review is unconstitutional
when denial is based on poverty or some other invidious discrimination).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol6/iss2/2

20

et al.: Intervention, Joinder, and Issue Preclusion: A New Look at Tort C
19801

MINNESOTA TORT CLAIMf PROCEDURES

an unusual result. How this difficulty is resolved will depend upon subsequent interpretations of Hart.
The unusual use of issue preclusion by the Hart court could be limited
in its effect by deeming damages as sui generis-an issue that must be
decided in case the appellate court finds liability as a matter of law,
reverses the trial court, and reinstates the damage award. This view of
damages, as an issue always essential to the judgment rendered, validates
the use of issue preclusion by the court. Nevertheless, to insure a well
considered determination of the damages issue and to mitigate the potential inequity of subsequent issue preclusion, the court should instruct the
jury as to the importance of the damages award.
Alternatively, one may view the Hart decision outside of the contribution analysis and see the Minnesota Supreme Court embarking on a new
approach to the use of issue preclusion. Under the new approach, collateral estoppel would apply when the parties to a prior suit had fully and
fairly litigated an issue and both parties had a sufficient stake in the outcome such that resolution of the issue derived from a full adversarial
conflict. In such situations, a nonparty may, in a subsequent suit, bar
relitigation of the issue decided. Certainly such a result would further
policies of judicial economy and consistent verdicts, and give the plaintiff
incentive to join all possible defendants in the first suit.125 Notwithstanding the benefits of this new approach, the determination of a nonessential issue still could be inequitably barred from relitigation.126
VI.

JOINDER OF TORTFEASORS

With its impact upon joinder of parties at the commencement of suit,
the Hart decision may achieve its greatest effect. Under the rules of civil
procedure, an injured plaintiff may elect between joining all tortfeasors
responsible for the injury in a single action or suing them separately.127
Before Hart, it seemed that no risks or burdens attached to using either
method;1 28 the law imposed upon each cotortfeasor joint and several 1ia125. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329-30 (1979) ("[D]efensive collateral estoppel gives a plaintiff a strong incentive to join all potential defendants in the
first action if possible."). Interestingly, the Court stated that if a plaintiff could have
joined as a party in a prior action, offensive collateral estoppel should be denied. Id at
331. If a defendant could have intervened, should defensive collateral estoppel be denied?
Cf Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 233 N.W.2d 732 (1975) (per curiam) (cotortfeasor who
did not intervene denied right to challenge failure of plaintiff to join all defendants).
126. See notes 111-15 supra and accompanying text.
127. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 113, § 10.8, at 469-70; Prosser,JointTorts
and Severat Liability, 25 CALIF. L. REv. 413, 414-17 (1937).
128.- Cf Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 233 N.W.2d 732 (1975) (per curiam) (joint
tortfeasors not "necessary" or "indispensable" parties; therefore, failure to join does not
prevent subsequent suit against other joint tortfeasor).
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bility. 129 Thus, an injured plaintiff reigned as master of the lawsuit,1 30
31
exercising an unfettered right to choose whom and when to sue.'
Many attorneys join everyone in sight. Nevertheless, several reasons
may prompt the decision not to join all cotortfeasors. First, an absent
cotortfeasor may possess a particularly good defense that will adversely
reflect upon plaintiffs claim. Second, prosecuting multiple defendants
may portend delay and increase costs, unnecessary evils with joint and
several liability. Third, the presence of particular counsel for a potential
defendant may prompt plaintiffs attorney to decide against joinder.
Fourth, plaintiff may desire a test suit against only one of several possible
defendants. Finally, the cotortfeasor may not be amenable to suit in
plaintiff's chosen forum. 132 An analysis of the Hart court's "equitable
solution" compels the conclusion that plaintiffs no longer possess an "unfettered right" to elect whom to sue in any one action. Through its potential for reducing recoveries133 and subjecting counsel to legal
malpractice claims,' 34 Hart actually coerces joinder of cotortfeasors. In
so doing, the decision raises numerous questions as to its scope and equitable application.
The pressures upon a plaintiff to join all potential defendants parallel
the burdens of intervening to protect a contribution claim. The plaintiff
will bear the burden of suing piecemeal when the use of such a procedure
forecloses the cotortfeasor's right of contribution. Apparently, the plaintiff will have the burden in all cases in which the cotortfeasor, sued separately, was not served with process in plaintiffs unsuccessful first suit.135
Furthermore, if Hart overrules Spitzack as to who bears the burden of
suing piecemeal, then future plaintiffs will always run a risk when all
potential defendants are not joined.136 The risk is a diminished or entirely negated award in a second action against a second cotortfeasor.137
This can occur when the jury in the second action decides that the previously exonerated defendant was at fault.
The potential for such a harsh result increases when one considers the
impact of Frey v. Snelgrove.138 Under Frey, a cotortfeasor who executes a
129. See note 63 supra.
130. See 1J. HETLAND & 0. ADAMSON, supra note 77, at 508, 608-09. To some extent,
complete mastery is diminished by modern declaratory judgment practice.
131. See, e.g., Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 331, 233 N.W.2d 732, 734 (1975) (per
curiam); 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
19.07[1], at 19-111 (2d ed. 1979); C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 334 (3d ed. 1976); Comment,

supra note 63, at 790.
132. See Comment, supra note 63, at 785 n.95.
133. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
134. See note 146 infra and accompanying text.
135. See notes 87-108 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
137. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
138. 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978).
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Pierringerrelease' 39 with the plaintiff normally is not a party to plaintiff's
suit against the non-settling defendant.1 40 Nonetheless, the jury allocates
fault between both cotortfeasors.14I An absent party's fault is calculated
in the jury's determination of the award. In Lines v. Ryan,,142 the court
extended Frey to a non-Pierringerrelease situation. Because Frey and Lines
require the court to submit to the jury the fault of an absent
tortfeasor, 143 the following scenario might occur:
Suit # 1: Driver A sues driver B alone for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. B defends by contending that A and driver C caused
the injuries. The jury awards $20,000, but finds A thirty-five percent at
fault, B thirty percent at fault, and C thirty-five percent at fault. Result: A takes nothing by his action.
139. The Minnesota court relied upon a recent law review article, Simonett, Release of
Joint Tor/feasors." Use of the Pierringer Release in Minnesota, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1
(1977), as the "definitive" analysis of Pzenger releases. See 269 N.W.2d at 922.
140. See 269 N.W.2d at 922.
141. See id
142. 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978).
143. Lines involved the consolidation of two actions, Lines' complaint against Ryan
and Jones' complaint against both Lines and Ryan. See id at 899. Lines contended that
the trial court erred by instructing the jury, relative to his complaint against Ryan, to
compare the negligence of Jones, even though Jones was not a party to Lines' case against
Ryan. Id at 902. The supreme court upheld the trial court's decision. See id. For case
authority, the Lines court relied upon Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918 (Minn. 1978)
and Connar v. West Shore Equip., Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 227 N.W.2d 660 (1975). The
Connar court stated the principle as follows:
It is established without doubt that, when apportioning negligence, a jury must
have the opportunity to consider the negligence of all parties to the transaction,
whether or not they be parties to the lawsuit and whether or not they can be
liable to the plaintiff or to the other tort-feasors either by operation of law or
because of a prior release.
Id at 44-45, 227 N.W.2d at 662, quoted i Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d at 902-03.
The Lines court also cited as support the Minnesota Jury Instruction Guides, 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, 148 S, Comment (2d ed. 1974). See 272 N.W.2d at 903. The
comment clearly shows that the comparison of a nonparty's negligence or fault is not
confined to Pzerringer release actions. See 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE JIG II, supra, at 128,
Comment.
In 1978, the Minnesota Legislature substantially changed Minnesota tort law. See
Act of Apr. 6, 1978, ch. 738, 1978 Minn. Laws 836 (codified in scattered sections of MINN.
STAT. chs. 541, 544, 549, 604). The changes included enactment of a comparative fault
statute. See id §§ 6-7, 1978 Minn. Laws at 839-40 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01(1)(la) (1978)). The Minnesota law closely parallels the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
See UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT § 1 (b). The Uniform Comparative Fault Act
specifically limits fault determination to partes and ignores "other persons who may have
been at fault with regard to the particular injury but who have not been joined as parties." Id § 2, Commissioner's Comment.
Arguably, by enacting part of the Uniform Act, the Legislature changed the law of
Fry and Lines. This argument lacks some force, however, when it is remembered that the
Uniform Act is pure comparative fault, see id § 2, and that Minnesota still requires a
defendant's fault at least to equal plaintiff's before an award of damages can be made. See
MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1978).
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Suit #2: A now sues C alone for the same injuries. C attempts to
implead B for contribution but is barred from doing so by the VigenSpitzack rule. Under Hart, C elects to bar relitigation of the damages
and contends that the collision was due to the fault of A and B. The
jury finds A thirty-five percent at fault, B thirty-five percent at fault,
14 4
and C thirty percent at fault. Result: A takes nothing by his action.

Thus, a five percent shift in fault allocation results in the plaintiff losing
the entire award. Application of the Hart doctrine in this manner emphasizes the harshness of penalizing a plaintiff for failure to join all
tortfeasors; had plaintiff sued both defendants in the first action above,
sixty-five percent of the award could have been recovered. Hart also
raises some important questions concerning the scope of the VigenSpitzack rule. Will it apply if the absent party was not amenable to suit
in plaintiff's forum? For example, assume that drivers A and B, both
residents of Minnesota, collide in Wisconsin with driver C, a resident of
Wisconsin. If plaintiff A decided to sue in Minnesota, driver C would
have a valid defense to any service of process outside Minnesota. If, in a
subsequent suit against C in Wisconsin, the Wisconsin court applied the
Hart rule, A would be in an unenviable position. C could prevent the
relitigation of damages and use B's negligence to diminish any recovery
from C. Is it fair to force the injured party to bear the risk of separate
suits?
Another question is whether Hart should apply if a reasonable plaintiff
could not have known of the existence or potential liability of an absent
party until during or after trial. Admittedly, this is an unusual situation,
but it could occur. Furthermore, if an insolvent tortfeasor is left out of
the original suit and later becomes solvent, 145 should Hart apply to plaintiff's subsequent suit against that tortfeasor?
These are hard cases showing how an extension of Hart could lead to
inequitable results, but an attorney must consider the possible application of Hart to separate lawsuits. In addition to the potential loss of recovery, a second factor coerces joinder of all tortfeasors at the
commencement of suit-the potential for legal malpractice. 146
144. Hart requires the jury to redetermine the fault of the first tortfeasor. 276 N.W.2d
at 169 n.6. Arguably, neither Frey nor Lines require this result when the first cotortfeasor's

fault has been previously adjudicated. Thus, without Hart and Spilzack, the problem
could be resolved by the jury allocating to A 35% and to B 65% of the fault. Then, in the
contribution action between B and C, the jury could apportion fault equally. The result
would leave A with 65% of the new award, with B and C equally liable.
The result could also be a severely diminished award. In Suit #2, if the jury found A
10% at fault, B 70% at fault, and C 20% at fault, A would recover only $4,000.
145. An insolvent tortfeasor might not defend against the action even if joined, and a
judgment against such a tortfeasor might be reopened. See MINN. R. CIv. P. 60.02.
146. Under normal circumstances, failure to join a cotortfeasor does not subject an
attorney to malpractice liability. Joint and several liability of all tortfeasors, coupled with
the almost impossible proof of both causation and damages in a malpractice action, usu-
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VII.

ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS

The impact of Hart upon tort claim procedures raises numerous issues
ally renders a malpractice claim untenable. After Hart, however, the elements of legal
malpractice are more easily proved and the attorney who fails to join all tortfeasors may
be liable to the client for any difference between the amount recovered and the amount
awarded as damages.
In Minnesota, a client suing his attorney for legal malpractice must prove four elements: (1) that an attorney-client relationship existed; (2) that certain acts constituted
negligence or breach of contract; (3) that the negligence or breach was the proximate
cause of the damage; and (4) that "but for" such negligence or breach of contract, the
client would have been successful. Godbout v. Norton, 262 N.W.2d 374, 376 (Minn. 1977)
(quoting Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144, 150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293-94 (1970)),
appeal dismissed, 437 U.S. 901 (1978); see R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 416, at 498-500 (1977) (plaintiff must prove each element). It is normally impossible to
prove all of these elements in a malpractice claim for increased damages because the jury
must decide the outcome of an earlier case, Titsworth v. Mondo, 95 Misc. 2d 233, 242, 407
N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1978), "the suit within a suit" problem. See Coggin, Attorney
Negligence... A Suit Within A Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REV. 225, 225 (1958); Symposium-Legal
Malpractice, 14 HAWAII B.J. 3, 13-14 (1978). In a Hart situation, however, the plaintiffclient can prove each element. The first, an attorney-client relationship, is given. The
second element is that failure to join all cotortfeasors in the first suit constitutes negligence.
The third element, proximate cause, is proved by the causal link between nonjoinder and
loss of recovery as outlined in the Hart decision. The fourth element is easily demonstrated. Had C been joined in suit # 1 hypothesized above, see note 144 and accompanying text, plaintiff would have recovered $13,000 because of C's joint and several liability.
Because C was sued separately and the right to contribution was foreclosed, plaintiff recovered nothing. The result would not differ much if plaintiff, instead of losing the entire
award, received a diminished one. See Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 170
(Minn. 1979).
In the analogous New York decision of Titsworth v. Mondo, 95 Misc. 2d 233, 407
N.Y.S.2d 793 (Sup. Ct. 1978), the client brought a malpractice claim against former counsel. Plaintiff settled the first action for personal injuries with the defendant and then sued
the attorney for counsel's failure to allege an adequate amount of damages. See id. at 237,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 794. The Titsworth court held that these allegations were sufficient to
preclude summary judgment for defendant. See id at 245, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 799. The Iowa
court, however, is of the view that a client cannot recover for counsel's failure to allege an
adequate amount of damages because deciding on the amount of the ad damnum clause is
peculiarly within the lawyer's judgment and the court cannot determine the proper
amount. See Baker v. Beal, 225 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Iowa 1975).
Collectibility is a necessary element to be proved by a plaintiff, Symposin-LegalMalpractice, supra, at 14; see, e.g., Sitten v. Clements, 257 F. Supp. 63, 67 (E.D. Tenn. 1966),
af'dpercuriam,385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967); R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra, § 418, at 511;
Note, A Modern Approach to the Legal Malpractice Tort, 52 IND. L.J. 689, 692-93 (1977), and
insolvency of the defendant is a defense to the tort. Id at 693. The Titsworth court stated
that if plaintiff proved he would have recovered in the first suit had it gone to trial, that
the judgment would have been collected, and that the attorney's negligence was the proximate cause of the loss, then plaintiff could recover as damages the amount of the claim lost
by settlement. See Titsworth v. Mondo, 95 Misc. 2d at 244-45, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 798-99.
But cf Glenna v. Sullivan, 310 Minn. 162, 170, 245 N.W.2d 869, 873 (1976) (per curiam)
("To allow a client who becomes dissatisfied with a settlement to recover against an attorney solely on the ground that a jury might have awarded them more than the settlement is
unprecedented." (footnote omitted)). Tisworth shows that when a client can prove an
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and problems both for attorneys and the court. Instead of resolving these
issues and problems on a case-by-case application of Vigen-Spit'zack, the
Minnesota Supreme Court should institute one of the following alternatives: make cotortfeasors rule 19147 parties to compel their joinder, or
overrule both Hart and Spitzack.
A.

Rule 19 Parties

Rule 19.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure defines a class of
persons who are needed for ajust adjudication.14 8 A person falls into this
class if, in his absence, complete relief cannot be accorded to the existing
parties or if he has an interest relating to the controversy and "the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring [additional] or
• . .inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest."149 A rule
19 party who is subject to the service of process must be joined in the
action.' 50 If he is not subject to process, then the court must weigh several factors to determine whether to dismiss the action or proceed without the absent person.' 5' Because of the importance of this rule to
piecemeal suits, a question arises: Are cotortfeasors rule 19 parties in
Minnesota?
Generally, cotortfeasors have been classified as "proper" parties to be
joined permissively under rule 20152 or sued separately. In Ktsch v.
attorney's negligence decreased a recovery, the client can recover the amount of the claim
lost, an element uniquely provable in the Hart situation.
The primary defense available to the attorney is the well-known legal principle that
"an attorney is not liable for an error as to a legal principle which is debatable or uncertain." R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, supra, § 215, at 307 (footnote omitted); see, e.g., Meagher
v. Kavli, 256 Minn. 54, 60-61, 97 N.W.2d 370, 375 (1959). With Hart, however, it is
unclear how an attorney can escape liability for nonjoinder, especially considering the
court's explicit language that plaintiffs who use piecemeal suits will bear the burden of
any foreclosure of contribution rights. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
An attorney who desires to sue tortfeasors separately should be able to escape malpractice liability if the client decides to use the piecemeal procedure after there has been
full disclosure of the "relevant considerations." See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8. While joinder decisions were once mechanical considerations
within the province of the lawyer's judgment, see id EC 7-7, Hart changes nonjoinder into
a procedure that may substantially prejudice the rights of a client. As such, whether or
not to join additional parties is now a decision exclusively within the authority of the
client and binding upon the attorney. Id.
147. MINN. R. Civ. P. 19.01.
148. See id.
149. Id
150. Ste id
151. See id 19.02.
152. See id 20.
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Skow,153 the Minnesota Supreme Court indicated that cotortfeasors were
not rule 19 parties.154 The court stated that a cotortfeasor with joint and
several liability normally constituted a permissive party only and an injured person could sue potential defendants piecemeal. 155 No risk would
attend plaintiff's act no matter how he chose to proceed. The court rendered the Kisch decision seven months before Spitzack was decided, however, and the latter may indeed change the character of joinder.
Under the Vigen-Spitzack rule, an absent cotortfeasor may lose his right
to contribution through the disposition of an action to which he is not a
party. The cotortfeasor's absence, therefore, impairs his ability to protect
his right of contribution. Thus, Spizack tranforms cotortfeasors into rule
19 parties, to be joined when feasible.
The Hart solution alters this analysis. To some degree, the Hart decision protects the absent cotortfeasor from loss of contribution.1 56 The
cotortfeasor, then, is not a rule 19 party because his ability to protect his
interest is not impaired. By shifting the burden of suing piecemeal to the
plaintiff, however, Hart prevents the plaintiff from securing complete and
final relief. 15 7 True, a plaintiff suing piecemeal may be seen to waive this
protection, but the interests involved are not just those of the plaintiff.
Policies of judicial economy and prevention of inconsistent judgments
also lie behind the rules of joinder. 158 Thus, the absent cotortfeasor
should be a rule 19 party because only then may the parties secure complete and final relief. By requiring joinder under rule 19, the supreme
court could remove the Hart trap and further the important judicial
goals of economy and consistency.
In Henris Food Products Co. v. Home Insurance Co. , 159 a Wisconsin federal
district court ruled that cotortfeasors in Minnesota were rule 19 par6
ties. 160 In that case, plaintiff stored food in a warehouse in Minnesota.1 1
2
An insurance policy covered the food so stored.16 Chemicals also were
stored in the warehouse.' 63 When chemical vapors permeated the food
153. 305 Minn. 328, 233 N.W.2d 732 (1975) (per curiam).
154. See id at 330-31, 233 N.W.2d at 733-34.
155. See id at 331, 233 N.W.2d at 734.
156. See notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text.
157. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text.
158. See, e.g., Hooper v. Huey, 293 Ala. 63, 69, 300 So. 2d 100, 105 (1974) (rule 19
intended to promote trial convenience, prevent multiplicity of suits, and expedite final
determination of litigation); Wheat v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 146 Mont. 105, 112, 404 P.2d
317, 321 (1965) (same, rule 20); Layne v. Huffman, 42 Ohio St. 2d 287, 289, 327 N.E.2d
767, 769-70 (1975) (rule 19 militates against possibility of inconsistent results or party
defending in multiple suits based upon same question of liability).
159. 474 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
160. See id at 893-94.
161. Id at 890.
162. Id
163. Id
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packages, 64 plaintiff sued the insurance company, and the insurance
company impleaded the owner of the chemicals for indemnity.165 The
chemical company moved for dismissal or severance because the Minnesota warehouser was an absent rule 19 party. 6 6 The court agreed, reasoning that Spitzack required this result.167 Because the Minnesota
warehouser was not amenable to suit in Wisconsin, having insufficient
contacts with the forum, the court stayed third-party proceedings pending either the warehouser's voluntary intervention or resolution of the
action pending in Minnesota state court where all parties were pres68

ent. 1

Henri's Food Products Co. underscores Spitzack's transformation of
cotortfeasors into rule 19 parties. But the federal court did not consider
the Hart decision. Arguably, the absent warehouser would be protected
from any adverse determination unless notice of the suit would require
the warehouser's intervention. Reading Hart in this manner would have
been too speculative for the federal court. Until Minnesota expressly decides the question, it seems reasonable to view cotortfeasors as rule 19
parties.
If cotortfeasors are rule 19 parties, a defendant can move to dismiss a
suit for the plaintiff's failure to join all cotortfeasors,169 as required by
rule 19.170 The court can then order their joinder or dismiss the suit
when the absent cotortfeasor is not amenable to service of process.' 71
If, however, the defendant does not object to plaintiff's failure to join,
what sanctions should be imposed? In Kzsch the cotortfeasor who was
absent from the first action was not permitted to quash service of process
in the second action.' 72 No sanction was imposed upon either the plaintiff or the original defendant. This reflected the court's belief that a rule
violation must be challenged in the original proceeding wherein the violation occurred. 17 The court's holding, explicitly limited to the Ksch
facts, 174 prevented the cotortfeasor from claiming prejudice for an alleged error in an earlier proceeding against the other cotortfeasor when,
164. The food itself was not affected. Chemical residues, however, were left on the
cartons containing the bottled dressing, the inside packing, and the outside of the bottles,
including the labels and the bottlecaps. Id at 890-91.
165. See id at 893.
166. Id
167. Id at 894.
168. See id It should be noted that the court did not say that the warehouser's failure
to intervene would permit the continuation of third-party proceedings.
169. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6).
170. See 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
19.19, at 19-345 to -351 (2d ed. 1979).
171. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 19.01.
172. See Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. at 334-35, 233 N.W.2d at 737.
173. See id. at 334, 233 N.W.2d at 736.
174. See id at 333 n.10, 233 N.W.2d at 735 n.10.
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informed as to that action, the absent cotortfeasor failed to intervene.175
Because of potential prejudice to the parties that can result from VgenSpiezack and Hart, the Kzsch decision should not be given precedential
value. Sanctions are necessary. If the defendant knows of the existence
of another tortfeasor not joined and fails to make a proper motion, the
defendant should not receive the benefit of the Vigen-Spitzack rule-possible prevention of the other tortfeasor's suit for contribution.176 If the
plaintiff fails to name the absent cotortfeasor as a rule 19 partyt 77 and
then sues that cotortfeasor in a second action, the court should quash the
subsequent service of process, or apply Hart and protect the new defendant by limiting his liability. The effect of this procedure would be the
emasculation of the V'gen-Spitzack rule. Plaintiffs will not want to bear
the burden of suing piecemeal and defendants will not want to increase
their exposure to liability for contribution. Therefore, cotortfeasors will
either be joined or impleaded. Separate suits should then vanish and
Vigen-Spiizack will become an antiquated rule, lurking in the background
as a coercive force, but rarely applied.
B.

Overrule Spitzack and Hart

Rule 19 status for cotortfeasors is a mechanical means of limiting Vgen
to its own facts-when cotortfeasors are present in the first action and
actually litigate their liability to the plaintiff, the judgment rendered
should be binding for purposes of contribution, despite the absence of
any formal adversary position established by the pleadings. The best
method of resolving the various issues and problems raised by Hart and
Spizack would be to overrule both decisions and refuse to extend Vigen
beyond its facts. Common liability could then be fixed at the time of the
accident and extinguished only by litigation between cotortfeasors.178
Constitutional and judicial problems would not have to depend upon the
175. See id. at 334-35 & n.14, 233 N.W.2d at 736 & n.14.
176. Cf Note, supra note 27, at 169-70 & 170 n.33 (suggesting that defendant should be
required to send notice to all third parties who could be found liable; failure to notify
allows cotortfeasor to relitigate fault determination).
177. This is required by MINN. R. Civ. P. 19.03.
178. Wisconsin takes the view that plaintiffs inability to win in his claim against one
cotortfeasor does not automatically preclude a second cotortfeasor's action for contribution. See Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables, Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, 125c, 243 N.W.2d 401,
403 (1976) (per curiam) (on rehearing). New Jersey takes a similar view. See Markey v.
Skog, 129 N.J. Super. 192, 200, 322 A.2d 513, 518 (Law Div. 1974) (defendant cannot be
deprived of his inchoate right by reason of plaintiff losing his right of direct action against
the other cotortfeasor).
In Reddnglon, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:
[T]he cause of action for contribution is separate and distinct from the underlying claim by the injured party. The common liability necessary to support the
cause of action for contribution is to be determined as of the time the accident
occurs and not as of the time the claim for contribution is asserted. . . . The fact
that an existing common liability to the injured party is subsequently extin-
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plaintiff presenting a good case against the defendant to preserve the absent cotortfeasor's right of contribution. If separate actions occur, then
the second defendant would implead or sue separately the first defendant
for contribution. No rule would prevent it.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The Hart solution raises many procedural questions in tort claim actions that substantially affect the interests of both parties and nonparties.
The quandary over whether to intervene or lose a possible contribution
claim is now a major consideration for absent tortfeasors. By coercing
joinder, the solution ends piecemeal suits, or places a substantial risk on
plaintiffs counsel if all parties are not joined. Hart's unique use of issue
preclusion opens the door for possible change in the prerequisites for collateral estoppel, substantially loosening the normal restraints. These
questions will require extensive case-by-case analysis unless the court
overrules Hart and Spitzack, or makes cotortfeasors rule 19 parties.
By recognizing cotortfeasors as rule 19 parties, the court can provide a
partial solution to the intervention and joinder problems. A person subject to the service of process will be joined and need not intervene. The
contribution claim will then be litigated or determined in that action. A
person not subject to the service of process, however, will have to decide
whether actual notice of the suit requires his intervention at the risk of
losing a claim for contribution.
Joinder will be compulsory. As a practical matter this removes the
problems of a diminished recovery and a malpractice claim for counsel's
failure to join all tortfeasors. Nevertheless, it spells the end of piecemeal
suits and raises the problem of how burdens should be allocated when
the person to be joined is beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
By the second alterantive--overruling Hart and Spi/zack-the court
will restore to the plaintiff his "unfettered right" to sue when and whom
he pleases. Contribution will be determined solely by action between the
tortfeasors, thereby placing a procedural burden on the defendant to implead others he believes responsible. Defendants who do not want to
relitigate their potential liability will take advantage of this procedural
device. If impleader is not allowed or some procedural rule defeats its
use, the trial should proceed. To avoid further problems for the courts
and tortfeasors, however, the question of contribution should be left to
litigation among those responsible for the injury.
guished as to one of the joint tort-feasors is immaterial insofar as the right of the
remaining joint tort-feasors to seek contribution from him is concerned.
72 Wis. 2d at 125c, 243 N.W.2d at 403 (citations omitted). This appears to be the general
rule when tortfeasors are sued separately. See id See generally Annot., 24 A.L.R.3d 318
(1969).
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